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Compiled by academics at three UK
universities, this report presents a profile of
participants in Extinction Rebellion’s (XR)
mass civil disobedience actions in London in
April and October 2019. 
The report is compiled from three datasets: a
protest survey of participants in each of
these two XR actions, with 303 short face to
face interviews and 232 mailed back
questionnaires in total; observational
analysis of court hearings of XR activists
charged with minor public order offences
following the April 2019 action, totalling a
further 213 activists; and data from a
previous survey of participants in two
climate change marches 2009/10, which we
use as a benchmark for interpreting our XR
survey.
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Extinction Rebellion set out to mobilise a
new generation of activists. As our data
shows, they have in part succeeded:
participants in Extinction Rebellion’s two
major actions in London in 2019 had
notably little prior experience of protest
action, and we encountered many first-
time activists. At the same time,
however, our socio-demographic profile
of XR’s activists in the UK reveals a
broadly familiar kind of
environmentalist: XR’s activists are
typically highly-educated and middle-
class (and though our survey did not
explicitly ask this, white); they identify
politically on the Left; and they
consciously adopt multiple pro-
environmental behaviours in the course
of their everyday lives.  
XR’s strength has been to create a new
public agency amongst people who are
not ‘natural’ protesters, and perhaps
even less so natural law-breakers, but
who were already persuaded of the
rightness of the climate cause, and
frustrated with the inability of both
‘politics as usual’ and lifestyle
environmentalism to bring about the
kind of transformative political change
that the climate emergency demands.
Mobilising this group enabled XR to
significantly expand the numbers of
people willing to engage in
environmental direct action, broadening
its age profile, and bringing non-violent
direct action on climate change into the
centre of political life in the UK. 
The report comes with an Afterword from
Sian Vaughan, a first-time Extinction
Rebellion activist.
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Key Findings 
1 |  XR has notably mobilised activists with relatively little prior 
experience of protest: most participants in XR’s London protests were 
not highly experienced protesters. In April 2019, nearly three-quarters 
of our respondents recalled having participated in ten demonstrations 
or fewer in their lives. 
2 |  XR activists have a much broader and more diverse age profile than has 
been the case for the previously small networks of mainly young 
activists involved in environmental direct action: in our survey, 
activists are split almost equally across age categories, except for those 
over 65, who comprise a smaller proportion of the total.  
3 |  The mean age of participants across both actions was 41.1 years old. 
Under 35s were slightly more numerous in the April London protests 
than in October (24.2% compared to 16.6%).  
4 |  The age profile of those arrested and charged in the April actions is 
strikingly similar to those surveyed on the streets, though older 
participants (56 and over) made up a higher proportion of those 
charged with an offence (32.2%) than those participating in the action 
as a whole (23.1%). 
5 | In court, older XR activists facing prosecution for civil disobedience 
spoke of their sense of responsibility to act on behalf of younger 
generations. 
6 | XR protest participation is highly feminised, with more women than 
men present in both the major 2019 demonstrations (64.5% in April, 
and 56.8% in October). 
7 | XR activists are highly educated: 85% hold at least a university (or 
equivalent level) degree, a figure over twice the national average, with 
over a third holding a postgraduate degree (Masters or PhD). 
8 | XR activists are predominantly middle-class: around two-thirds of our 
survey sample self-identify as middle-class (40.9% identified as lower 
middle-class, and 23.3% as upper middle-class). 
9 | XR’s activists are characterised by high proportions of the self-
employed, of part-time workers, and of students, all mainly identifying 
as middle-class. 
10 |  Data on those arrested and charged suggests that participation in these 
protests was strongly English, southern, and non-metropolitan: over 
three-quarters of those charged were from below the Severn-Wash line 
traditionally separating the north and south of England. 
11 |  The south-west is a particular focal point for XR activists: just over a 
third of those charged were from the West Country, with hotspots in 
Bristol, Frome, Stroud, and Totnes. Southern coastal towns were also 
well-represented amongst defendants. 
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12 |  By the time of the London October 2019 protest, XR was able to rely on 
a core of participants who had previously been engaged to a 
considerable degree in the movement, ranging from involvement in 
local group activities to previous arrests. 
13 |  In only two of the 144 court cases we observed relating to arrests during 
the April 2019 protest, did protesters have any previous convictions for 
protest action. However, our survey showed that 12.4% of the 
participants in the October 2019 protests had previously been arrested 
for protest. 
14 |  Although most XR protesters participated with a group, a higher 
proportion reported participating alone than is usual for mass protests. 
15 |  XR activists are heavily involved in institutional politics as well as 
protest. They are much more likely to vote and be members of political 
parties than the general population, but they are also sceptical about 
the ability of political parties and government to deliver effective 
solutions to environmental problems. 
16 |  XR is a movement of the green left: its activists are primarily 
supporters of the Green Party, although more of them voted for the 
Labour Party in 2017 than any other party. We found almost no support 
among XR activists for the Conservative Party, and very little for the 
Liberal Democrats. 
17 |  Frustration, worry, and anger are the most prevalent emotions for XR 
protesters when asked how they feel about climate change, followed by 
anxiety and fear. In contrast, powerlessness and hopelessness are the 
least felt emotions. 
18 |  XR protesters have a strong sense of public agency, and do not believe 
that we can rely on companies and the market, governments, or 
lifestyle changes by individuals to solve the climate crisis. 
19 |  Three motivations are shared by almost all XR protesters—raising 
awareness of the climate emergency (99%); pressuring politicians to 
act (99.5%); and acting out of a sense of civic duty and moral 
responsibility (95.8%). XR activists are much more likely to state that 
they are motivated to act out of solidarity than out of self-interest. 
20 |  XR’s radicalism is underpinned by a strong intergenerational 
commitment, and driven by a moral obligation to act (for example, see 
Sian Vaughan’s afterword). 
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Introduction 
Climate activism in the UK was transformed in autumn 2018, when an issue 
thought by many to be too abstract and scientific to generate widespread 
social mobilisation went to the top of the news agenda. In large part, this 
was because of the seemingly sudden emergence of mass grassroots climate 
protests. A wave of protest started in late summer 2018, when Greta 
Thunberg launched her school strike for the climate; this lone act of protest 
had become an international movement involving around 6 million by 
September 2019 (Wahlström et al 2019). At the same time that Thunberg 
was sitting outside the Swedish parliament, Extinction Rebellion 
(henceforth XR), the other major new force in climate activism, and the 
subject of this report, was preparing its first action campaign: a public 
declaration of rebellion in London’s Parliament Square on 31 October 2018. 
This new engagement in grassroots action was undoubtedly spurred by fresh 
evidence of the worsening impacts of climate change detailed in the IPCC’s 
Special Report on global temperature warming of 1.5°C, released in October 
2018 (IPCC 2018), but there was clearly a constituency ready for a call to 
action based on ambitious aims and challenging tactics.  
Planned by a small group of activists with previous experience in climate 
and human rights activism and the Occupy movement, XR’s approach fits 
within a longstanding tradition of transgressive environmental action, but 
has also proved both novel and unusually potent. It is novel in its emphasis 
on grief and mass disobedience, its alarmism and its privileging of moral 
(rather than political) action. It is potent in its capacity to mobilise tens of 
thousands of people to take illegal disruptive protest action (Doherty, De 
Moor and Hayes 2018). To achieve this, the group’s founders took 
inspiration from transformative civil rights movements and, particularly, 
Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) study of civil resistance against 
authoritarian regimes. Arguing that non-violence is more effective than 
violence in bringing about societal transformation, and that only a small 
percentage of the population (3.5%) needs to be actively engaged to create 
system change,1 XR has aimed to inspire mass non-violent civil 
disobedience to force governments to accede to three demands. These are: 
1. Tell the truth about climate change; 2. Achieve net zero carbon emissions 
by 2025 and halt biodiversity loss; and 3. Create Citizens’ Assemblies to 
make decisions on a just transition to net zero carbon.  
In order to compel political parties and institutions to meet these demands 
and take emergency action, XR has sought to create economic and civil 
disruption. Inviting mass arrests plays a central role in the group’s action 
 
1 Extinction Rebellion, ‘We set our mission on what is necessary’, Our Principles and Values, last 
accessed 29 May 2020: https://rebellion.earth/the-truth/about-us/  
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strategy: XR seeks to ‘overwhelm police resources’ by stretching its 
operational capacity on the ground, escalating costs, and filling up jail cells; 
the end goal is to create such disruption that XR will be able to ‘force a 
political solution’,2 or as one of the campaign’s co-founders Roger Hallam 
put it in February 2019:  
The more dramatic the civil disobedience, the better. […] You need enough for 
the state to have to decide whether to use repression on a mass scale or invite 
you into the room. […] We’ll give the authorities a fundamental dilemma: ‘Do 
we allow these people to continue blocking the center [sic] of a global city, or do 
we arrest thousands of people?’ If they opt for arresting thousands of people, 
lots of things are going to happen. They will be overwhelmed. (quoted in Hedges 
2019) 
Mass civil disobedience is XR’s primary strategy, therefore. For Hallam, this 
means building a new kind of environmental movement which appeals to 
the right as well as to the left, and recruits participants beyond the ‘usual 
suspects’ of radical environmental activism: 
We must appeal to people who don’t join or support environmental causes, be 
that because of ideology, social class, culture, religion or race. (Hallam 2019: 
49) 
XR is particularly intriguing in this respect, as its model of mass 
disobedience undertaken by ‘ordinary’ members of the public consciously 
seeks to move beyond the hitherto well-established model of environmental 
non-violent direct action. This well-established model is based around more 
or less surprise actions undertaken by small groups of activists, and is 
typically characterised by strong intra-group ties and inter-personal bonds 
of mutual trust. Of course, some XR activists continue to work in this way; 
but moving beyond this model is challenging. One reason for this is that 
breaking the law, being arrested, charged, and prosecuted, are stressful, 
time-consuming, and sometimes expensive activities which can have 
serious consequences for the personal and professional lives of those 
involved (Sommier, Hayes and Ollitrault 2019), even where the penalties 
ultimately imposed by the courts are relatively minor (as has typically been 
the case for XR activists, at least so far). As this statement made in court by 
a sixty year old former midwife makes clear, for many who were arrested 
during the XR protests, taking this kind of action was a major step: 
My father was a solicitor and I was brought up with great respect for the rule of 
law. I have never been part of any protest or taken to the streets before Extinction 
Rebellion.  
 
2 Extinction Rebellion powerpoint presentation, October Rebellion Action Design Version 1, 25 
September 2019 
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How typical are first-timer protesters like this new activist among XR 
participants? In this report, we provide a socio-demographic profile of the 
activists who participated in XR’s major actions in London in April and 
October 2019, and of the XR activists who were charged with public order 
offences for undertaking civil disobedience in the April 2019 action. 
Focusing on the social and political characteristics of XR’s activists, our 
report provides an answer to the question of whether XR has, in this sense, 
succeeded in creating a new kind of environmental movement. Much of the 
media commentary on XR has focused on individual ‘rebels’, with profiles of 
retirees, former police officers, and GPs; ‘ordinary’ citizens given space to 
explain their motivations.3 So far, however, these assertions are no more 
than anecdotes and commentary; there has to date been no comprehensive 
analysis of participants in XR’s actions.4 Our report fills this gap. 
Our XR data is derived from two datasets: surveys of participants in XR’s two 
major 2019 actions in London, with 303 face-to-face and 232 mail-back 
respondents in total; and police and observational court data on XR activists 
charged with minor public order offences following the April 2019 action, 
totalling a further 213 individuals. We used standardised protest survey 
methodology (http://www.protestsurvey.eu/) for the XR protests in London 
in April 2019 (‘April Rebellion’), and again in October (‘London 
International Rebellion’). During the protests, we conducted interviews and 
distributed leaflets with a link to an online questionnaire, with 124 face-to-
face interviews and 103 mail-back responses received from protesters in 
April, and 179 face-to-face interviews and 129 mail-back responses from 
protesters in October (see the Appendix for fuller details of our 
methodology).5 In order to benchmark this data, we compare it to survey 
data on previous UK protests, notably two marches on climate change in 
London in 2009 and 2010 (Saunders et al 2012). 
Our police and observational court data concerns XR activists charged under 
section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 during the April 2019 protests.6 In 
April, the Metropolitan Police made a total of 1,148 arrests of 1,076 separate 
individuals during the occupation of four sites in central London 
(Parliament Square, Marble Arch, Oxford Circus, and Waterloo Bridge).7 
 
3 For example, Cornwall’s ordinary rebels: How Extinction Rebellion turned us into arrestables, Cornwall 
Live, 28 April 2019: https://www.cornwalllive.com/news/cornwall-news/gallery/cornwalls-ordinary-
rebels-how-extinction-2808121; ‘Time is running out’: XR activists on why they risked arrest, The 
Guardian, 30 September 2019: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/sep/30/time-is-
running-out-xr-activists-on-why-they-risked-arrest; The rebels, The Tortoise, 1 October 2019: 
https://torto.se/2n7rr0B  
4 XR has no formal members: those who accept its principles and take action to support its demands are 
effectively part of the movement. To the extent that there is a ‘membership’, it consists of participants 
in its meetings and public protests:  
5 We did not survey children and young people under 18. 
6 Public Order Act 1986, s14. Section 14 concerns public assemblies; arrests covered failure to disperse, 
obstruction of the public highway, and so on: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/section/14  
7 Metropolitan Police Service, Total costs for the Extinction rebellion protests in April 2019, June 2019: 
https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-
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These protesters were charged in two phases, first in late spring, and then 
through summer and autumn 2019. We observed court hearings for the 
second phase, at the City of London Magistrates Court, on seven separate 
Fridays in August, September, and October 2019, noting details of 144 
individual defendants in total, or 17% of the total number of defendants 
charged in the second phase.8 In addition, the Met released to the media the 
basic identifying data of the 69 activists charged in the first phase, giving us 
profile information on a total of 213 activists, or 23% of those charged. This 
tells us their age, their identified gender, where they live, and whether they 
have prior convictions for participation in direct action. Attendance at the 
trial hearings also enabled us to collect observational ethnicity data, and to 
note what proportion of defendants entered a plea of not guilty, and so 
elected for trial. 
 
 
  
 
police/priorities_and_how_we_are_doing/corporate/met-operations---extinction-rebellion---april-
2019.  
8 This percentage feels intuitively correct: on each of the seven occasions, hearings were taking place in 
two courts, and we covered one court. Given that we attended on roughly one third of potential occasions, 
it logically follows we covered around a sixth of the possible pool of hearings. 
im
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Experience of activism 
As we noted above, one of the main aims of XR is to mobilise new activists 
and reach beyond the ‘usual suspects’ of established environmental direct 
action networks. As Table 1 (below) shows, the evidence from our survey is 
that XR was at least partially successful in achieving this aim: most 
participants in the 2019 London actions were not highly experienced 
protesters, and this was the case for both the April and the October actions. 
Moreover, they were also comparatively less experienced than our 
benchmark data drawn from the London climate change demonstrations a 
decade earlier. Not everyone who participated in XR’s 2019 London actions 
was there to be arrested; we saw and spoke to many people who were simply 
there to demonstrate, listen to the speeches and communicate their 
frustration with government inaction (see Figure 2, page 23). Yet given that 
the 2009 and 2010 climate change demonstrations were conventional 
marches, and XR’s 2019 actions were consciously designed around an 
explicit arrest tactic, if anything we might have expected the 2019 protesters 
to be more rather than less experienced than 2009/2010 protesters. Our 
survey data suggests the opposite.  
Table 1 | Past participation in demonstrations (ever) 
 
XR protesters had participated in fewer demonstrations previously 
compared to UK climate marchers (2009-10). Just under one-fifth of XR 
protesters were ‘stalwarts’: that is to say they had participated in more than 
21 demonstrations ‘ever’. Although this proportion is substantial, it is lower 
than for the two more conventional climate marches surveyed in 2009 and 
2010. Further, around 10% of XR protesters were protest ‘novices’, who had 
never participated in a demonstration before. Surprisingy, this figure was 
slightly higher in October than in April, and was in both cases around twice 
the level for the 2009/2010 UK climate marchers. Finally, around half of XR 
protesters had been on five or fewer protests prior to their participation in 
the 2019 action at which we surveyed them; at the 2009/20 marches, this 
figure was much lower, at just over a third. 
 XR  
April 2019 
(%) 
XR  
Oct 2019 
(%) 
XR  
combined 
(%) 
UK climate marches 
(2009-10) 
(%) 
None 9.6 11.0 10.4 4.9 
1-5 46.8 35.6 40.6 29.7 
6-10 17.0 21.2 19.3 23.1 
11-20 7.4 13.6 10.9 16.8 
21+ 19.1 18.6 18.9 25.5 
Total (n) 94 118 212 572 
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Socio-demographics of XR protesters 
XR protesters are therefore relatively inexperienced. On the face of it, XR 
appears to have succeeded in one essential part of its strategy: persuading 
new activists not only to come onto the streets, but also to take part (at least 
to some extent) in disruptive protest. Does this mean that these activists are 
in some way different from those we typically find in climate change 
protests? Can we explain the comparative inexperience of XR protesters by 
looking at their age profiles? 
Age 
Our data clearly point to XR as a cross-generational movement. Participants 
in the London protests spanned a broad range of ages, with close to one-
fifth in each of the under 25, 25-35, 36-45, 46-55 and 56-64 age categories, 
but fewer aged 65 or older (8%, compared to 18.3% of the UK population, 
ONS August 2019), see Table 2.  
Table 2 | Age categories of XR activists  
Notes: percentages are shown in columns. Total (n) is lower than the total number of respondents due 
to missing data. This is based on face to face interview data, given response rate bias, see appendix for 
more details. In the final column, the total (n) is lower than the total number of defendants due to 
unobtainable data for eight defendants. 
There were nonetheless some minor differences in the age distributions 
across the two separate 2019 London protests. For example, there were 
proportionally fewer under 25s in October as Table 2 shows. XR protesters 
were on average younger, especially in April, than demonstrators surveyed 
on the annual climate marches in 2009 and 2010. But as we have noted, there 
is a key difference between these demonstrations: the 2009/10 actions were 
conventional marches, while the XR actions were designed to be disruptive. 
 
 XR Protest survey data   
Age category Apr 2019 
(%) 
Oct 2019 
(%) 
Combined 
(%) 
XR Defendants 
(%) 
UK climate 
marches (%) 
Under 25 24.2 16.6 19.7 13.2 11.3 
25-35 20.2 23.4 22.1 24.9 18.9 
36-45 16.1 18.3 17.4 16.6 16.4 
46-55 16.1 18.9 17.7 13.2 19.4 
56-64 14.5 15.4 15.1 17.1 18.8 
65+ 8.9 7.4 8.0 15.1 15.2 
Total (n) 124 175 299 205 592 
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Figure 1 | Age categories by protest frequency (ever) XR and CCC compared 
 
Notes: CC refers to the 2009/10 climate change march data, XR to the April and October London actions. 
The numbers on the left-hand-side refer to the number of protests that respondents have been to ever, 
excluding the XR action at which they were surveyed. The numbers at the bottom are the percentage of 
people in each age group.  
Does this help explain our findings about inexperience? Figure 1 shows, in 
general, that there is an age effect at work: the younger protesters are, the 
less likely they are to be experienced protesters. This holds both for our XR 
survey, and for our benchmark 2009/10 climate change march survey data. 
But the effect is stronger for XR protesters: just over half of the XR 
protesters who had participated in 5 or fewer demonstrations were aged 35 
or younger, compared to 38% of the 2009/10 protesters. What we have not 
captured in Figure 1 is the striking fact that nine of every 10 of the XR 
protesters aged 35 or younger had participated in protest five times or fewer; 
and all of them had participated ten times or fewer. In the 2009/10 climate 
change march survey data only half were relative novices (participating 5 or 
fewer times) and more than one-fifth had participated at least 11 times. This 
suggests that XR’s mobilisation of relative protest novices can, at least to 
some extent, be explained as a youth effect. 
Yet our data also show that older participants played a key role in the 
character of the XR actions. Here, it is significant that that age profile of XR 
arrestees (‘Defendants’, in Table 2, above) was older than those we surveyed 
on the street. Of those arrested and charged in the April actions, the 
youngest age group is slightly under-represented, compared to all those on 
the streets; whilst the over 65s are significantly over-represented in the 
courts, which corresponds to XR’s strong commitment to intergenerational 
responsibility. In numerous mitigating statements given in court after 
pleading guilty, older defendants spoke of their sense of obligation to 
0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00
5 or less XR
5 or less CC
6 to 10 XR
6 to 10 CC
11 to 20 XR
11 to 20 CC
21+ XR
21+ CC
Age categories by protest frequency (ever)
XR and CCC (climate) compared
Under 25 25-35 36-45 46-55 56-64 65+
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younger generations, sometimes including their own grandchildren. As one 
woman, born in 1942, said: 
I am a mother and a grandmother and a great grandmother […]. As part of the 
generation whose complacency has led to this emergency, I should prepare to be 
arrested. I couldn’t in conscience stand aside in the face of the threats that 
confront us all.  
For another, born in 1944: 
As retired adults we should act on behalf of young people and schoolchildren 
who cannot risk criminal records. (Both quoted from court hearings of 23 August 
2019.) 
In a period when political differences between generations are discussed 
often, XR has clearly succeeded in appealing across generational divides. 
Whilst this is similar to previous climate change marches, it also makes it 
distinct from other environmental direct action movements in the UK. 
Studies have shown that direct action environmental activists are mainly 
young adults, whether in the anti-roads movement of the 1990s (Seel et al 
2000; Wall 1999), or in more recent cases such as the Camp for Climate 
Action (Saunders 2012).  
Education and Class 
Despite our finding of the relative inexperience of the participants in the 
2019 actions, our protest survey data also tells a rather more familiar story 
about XR’s activists. Our survey reveals that a striking number of XR 
activists are highly educated, to degree level or higher. In the UK, 42% of the 
population aged 21-64 have university-level educational qualifications 
(ONS 2018). But among XR participants, the proportion of those educated 
to degree level is more than twice the UK average: across both our surveys, 
85.8% of respondents say they had at least a degree or equivalent 
qualification (or were studying for one), with over a third (34.6%) telling us 
that they hold a postgraduate degree. As striking as these figures are, they 
were both consistent across our April and October survey data, with few 
differences between the two, and with the 2009/2010 climate marches data, 
see Table 3, below. 
Indeed, the high education levels of the 2019 XR participants and the 
2009/2010 climate march participants are startlingly similar (with 85.8% and 
86.5% having at least a bachelor’s degree). Remarkably, high levels of 
education are consistent across all age categories. Approximately half of the 
respondents across all age groups have a degree, with approximately 
another 40% in all age groups over 25 years of age also having a postgraduate 
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degree (compared to only 8% of those under 25, which can be explained by 
age effects). 
Table 3 | Education levels of XR activists 
Note: data are presented in columns. The n is smaller than the overall sample size due to missing data. 
Given that access to higher education in the UK is strongly correlated with 
class position, does the implication that XR protesters are from the middle 
classes ring true? In order to get an understanding of the social class of XR 
participants, we use self-identification rather than a measure based on 
occupation.9 To the extent that they identify with any social class, XR 
participants identify as middle-class, with around two-thirds of participants 
placing themselves in this class (40.9% lower middle class, and 23.3% upper 
middle class; aggregated sample for both mobilisations). Slightly fewer than 
10% overall see themselves as working-class (9.8%), and a very small 
minority (around 1% for both mobilisations) identify as upper-class. 
However, this only accounts for three-quarters of our sample; of the rest, 
14.0% of respondents identify as ‘none’ when asked about their class, whilst 
a further 10.9% say they ‘don’t know’ to which social class they belong. This 
subjective class position is similar to the profile of respondents to the 
2009/10 climate change march surveys, but it contrasts with general 
population surveys for the UK, in which more people identify as ‘working 
class’ (51%) than middle class (39%), while 1% of Britons consider 
themselves upper class, and the remainder don’t know (Smith 2019).  
Whilst measurements of class are inherently controversial (a self-
identification measure is very different from the National Readership 
Survey’s (NRS) social grading methods in which the profession of the highest 
income earner in a household is often used as a proxy for class), our sample 
provides evidence that XR participants are substantially more likely to see 
themselves as middle-class then the UK population as a whole. Regarding 
 
9 We chose not to collect occupation data in April; in previous protest surveys we had found it unusable 
because respondents had used variable terms and degrees of specification that were oftentimes too 
generic to allow us to make accurate classifications. 
Highest educational 
qualification 
Apr 2019 
(%) 
Oct 2019 
(%) 
Combined 
(%) 
UK climate 
marches 
(%) 
GCSE, equivalent or lower 3.2 2.5 2.4 0.7 
A Level or equivalent 6.4 7.6 7.1 3.1 
HND 2.1 4.2 3.3 9.7 
Degree or equivalent 52.1 50.0 51.2 42.7 
Higher degree (MA/MSc, PhD) 36.2 33.1 34.6 43.8 
Other 0.0 2.5 1.4 N/A 
Total (n) 94 118 232 586 
14 | CUSP WORKING PAPER No 25 
XR protesters’ employment situation, many more are self-employed (24.5%, 
compared to 15% in the UK overall, ONS 2019), retired (18.1%) or in full- or 
part-time work (both 17.1%) than any other category; 9.9% are in education, 
4.6% are unemployed (compared to 3.8% in the UK overall—ONS 2019) and 
0.9% are housewives or househusbands. 
As noted above, there are some differences in age distributions across the 
two XR London actions. This is very likely reflected in the lower proportion 
of students who participated in October compared to April; the overall 
finding that 9.9% of XR respondents are currently in education hides a sharp 
contrast between 14.7% of April respondents and 6.2% of October 
respondents. Lower rates of student participation in October might be 
attributed to the demands on student time during term-time. In October, 
the lower proportion of students is compensated for by significantly higher 
numbers of retirees. Otherwise, there is consistency in the class identities 
and employment status of XR participants at the two different points in 
time. On the one hand, XR is not a movement of the economically 
marginalised; but on the other, there are high proportions of the self-
employed, of part-time workers, and of students, all mainly identifying as 
middle-class. For different reasons, these groups are more likely than others 
to enjoy some autonomy and flexibility over their use of time, facilitating 
their engagement in protest. In the social movements literature, this is 
known as an effect of biographical availability (McAdam 1990).  
In this way, XR activists therefore reflect the traditional typical profile of 
environmental activists: they are highly educated, and employed in fields 
such as education, health, welfare, and the creative professions,10 which are 
relatively distant from finance and corporate capitalism (Cotgrove and Duff 
1980: 344; Doherty 2002: 57-63). 
Where do XR protesters come from? 
The majority of respondents to our protest survey (56.2%) spent more than 
90 minutes travelling to get to the protest actions in London; 37.1% took 
between 30 minutes and an hour; but only 6.7% say that they had taken less 
than 30 minutes. This suggests that the majority of participants were willing 
to invest significant time and resources to attend. The data on those charged 
following the April protests provides a clearer picture of the home locations 
of the arrested defendants. They come predominantly from the south of 
England: of the 197 defendants for whom we were able to ascertain home 
addresses, over three-quarters (77.7%) were from below the Severn-Wash 
line traditionally separating the north and south of England, with the 
 
10 As indicated in the responses to a question on occupation asked in the October survey. 
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remaining defendants split between England above the Severn-Wash 
(12.7%), Wales (6.1%), Scotland (2%), and outside the UK (1.5%). 
Within the court data, two patterns are apparent. First, whilst London was 
strongly represented (16.8% of all defendants, or 33/197), large urban areas 
outside London were under-represented, with only 13 (6.6%) defendants 
from Birmingham, Greater Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Bradford, 
Sheffield, Newcastle, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Swansea, and Cardiff combined. 
In contrast, southern coastal towns and cities are strongly represented: 
defendants came from Cromer, Leigh on Sea, Ramsgate, Brighton, 
Worthing, Bournemouth, Plymouth and St Ives. Most strikingly, just over a 
third (34%, 67/197) are from the West Country, with hotspots in Bristol, 
Frome, Stroud, and Totnes in particular. These geographical factors point 
probably to the importance of local cultural networks to both participation 
(in general) and to the acceptance of civil disobedience (in particular), 
particularly the Transition Towns and Flatpack Democracy networks, which 
are strong in the south-west (see below for more data on overlaps between 
XR and Transition Towns). 
Participation in the XR London protests was therefore strongly English and 
southern, with a strong non-metropolitan character. Since there were 
separate XR protests in Cardiff, Manchester, Leeds, and Glasgow during the 
summer of 2019, the southern bias of participants in the London events does 
not perhaps tell the whole story. However, XR clearly focused its 
mobilisation on the two London rebellions; even the week-long ‘Northern 
rebellion’ in Deansgate, Manchester in late August 2019 was presented 
primarily as a rehearsal for the October ‘International Rebellion’ in London. 
The strong presence in London from the towns of the south-west and south 
coast compared to major cities seems to indicate the areas where XR has its 
strongest support. 
Ethnicity 
Our protest survey data confirms the impression from court data that those 
protesting in London were overwhelmingly British, even if their families are 
somewhat more cosmopolitan: 83.7% were born in the UK, and 99% live in 
the UK, although fewer—79%—have a primary parent (mother if known) 
from the UK. In contrast, 7.1% of participants were born in European 
countries, and 9.3% further afield; 12.3% have a European primary parent, 
and 9.7% have a parent from elsewhere in the world. Although we did not 
collect data about ethnicity, of the 132 defendants we were able to observe 
in court,11 all but two were white.  
 
11 The total number of cases was 144, but 12 were heard in absentia. 
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A larger dataset on the self-defined ethnicity of 1,143 XR arrestees from the 
April London protests, provided by the Metropolitan Police (following a 
Freedom of Information request), shows a broadly similar picture. Here, 
1,032 arrested activists identified as White (90.3%), whilst a further 54 
(4.7%) did not state their ethnicity. Of the remaining 5%, 11 identified as 
Asian (1%), 5 as Black (0.4%), 31 as Mixed (2.7%), and 10 as Other (0.9%).12 
For reference, 86% of the population of England and Wales identified as 
White in the 2011 census, 7.5% as Asian, 3.3% as Black, 2.2% as Mixed, and 
1% as Other (gov.uk 2018). 
If XR has to a certain extent succeeded in recruiting new activists, the data 
from its London actions suggests that it has not done so from outside the 
highly educated, white, middle-class constituency which has long been 
characteristic of the environmental movement in the UK. 
Gender 
We also noted a familiar pattern in the gender profile of XR protesters. On 
the streets, a higher proportion of women compared to men were present in 
both XR actions, most notably so at the April 2019 blockades (64.5% women, 
compared to 56.8% in October, according to self-identification data in our 
survey; only one survey respondent—in October—identified as being from a 
gender other than male or female, although seven of our face-to-face 
interviewees identified as ‘other’). This predominance of women is a feature 
shared with the school climate strike movement (Wahlström et al 2019), as 
well as the ‘American resistance’ protests of 2017 (Fisher 2019); and it was 
also a notable feature of the 2009/2010 climate marchers in the UK.  
We did, however, note differences in the gender profile of those we surveyed 
on the streets compared to those for whom we have police and observational 
court data. Amongst those arrested and charged in April, our data on gender 
is observational only (in court, defendants are not asked to self-identify, or 
to confirm, their gender). Here, men are in the majority, making up 53.1% of 
those charged (n= 213), with women making up the remaining 46.9%. 
Amongst those we observed entering pleas (n=139), there is a broadly even 
split between men and women for those pleading guilty (men: 51.1%; 
women, 48.9%; n=94). For those pleading not guilty (n=45), the difference is 
more acute, with men constituting 62.2% of this group, and women 37.8%. 
The relatively small numbers for whom we have data mean that any 
conclusions we can draw are inevitably tentative, but it seems that men in 
XR are both slightly more likely than women to be arrested and charged, and 
 
12 Freedom of Information request reference 01.FOI.19.010861, August 2019: 
https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-
police/disclosure_2019/august_2019/information-rights-unit---ethnicity-of-individuals-charged-in-
the-extinction-rebellion-protests-over-easter-2019  
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subsequently to plead not guilty (and thus elect to go to trial). Of the 45 who 
pleaded not guilty, 17 were women and 28 were men. Whilst gendered 
differences between arrests and protest participation may be explained by 
either activist behaviours or policing decisions, the greater willingness of 
men to plead not guilty is more likely to be explained by structural or 
cultural factors. For instance, men are likely to have fewer caring 
responsibilities and therefore greater willingness to spend more time in the 
courts. 
  
©
 Clare Saunders  
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Social networks, activist experience, and organisational 
memberships 
The importance of recruitment via social networks is very strongly 
recognised in existing literature about social movements. Involvement in 
social networks provides people with social capital (Putnam 1993); increases 
their ‘structural availability’ (Cable 1992, Schussman and Soule 2005, 
Saunders et al 2012); socialises them into movement activities; and enables 
them to develop activist identities (Johnston and Larana 1994). We may 
consider this to be particularly important where activism involves a 
significant degree of risk, such as arrest and imprisonment. For those 
working with children, or in the care sector, the consequences of even a 
conditional discharge are serious for DBS checks and thus for continuing or 
future employment. We might therefore expect XR’s activism to require the 
type of ongoing support, solidarity, and understanding that social and 
organisational networks can provide. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, over two-thirds (69.2%) of those we 
surveyed in October say that they had been involved in XR or in XR-related 
actions prior to the October ‘Rebellion’. Around one in ten (9.2%) had 
participated in the November 2018 London Bridge blockades, and just over 
three in ten (31.5%) had participated in the April 2019 action. Moreover, the 
vast majority (85.4%) were participants in XR local groups, and most of that 
sub-group had previously participated in actions organised by their group 
(69.3% of all October respondents). By October, therefore, XR was able to 
rely on a core of participants who had previously been engaged to a 
considerable degree in the movement, ranging from involvement in local 
group activities to previous arrests. For a movement launched the previous 
year, this is a significant indicator of the rapid development of a core of 
committed activists. 
One in eight (12.4%), indeed, told us in October that they had previously 
been arrested for protesting. We did not collect data on previous XR 
participation in the April survey so cannot compare across the two datasets; 
but in our court data there was little evidence of activists having previous 
convictions for involvement in protest (which would typically be for criminal 
damage, or public order offences such as obstruction of the highway, or 
aggravated trespass). In 94 of the 144 individual hearings we witnessed, the 
defendants pleaded guilty, and prior convictions were discussed in court; 
only two defendants had prior convictions for this type of relevant offence, 
and only a handful had prior convictions or cautions of any kind. The typical 
activist arrested and charged in the April mobilisations, at least, did not fit 
the profile of the experienced, ‘disobedient’, activist. 
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Given that the 2019 XR mobilisations are on a scale previously not witnessed 
in UK environmental direct action, this is perhaps unsurprising. But there 
are further peculiarities of XR’s mobilisation. At the first set of court 
hearings we attended (23 August), we witnessed two defendants recognise 
each other, and chat briefly in the waiting room: they first met each other in 
the police van, after they were arrested (20 April, Oxford Circus). Three 
weeks later (13 September), two defendants—a man and a woman, each in 
their mid-50s, one from Brighton, one from Sutton in Surrey—expressed 
surprise as the police body camera footage of the woman’s arrest on 21 April 
was played in court; the pair then realised that they were sitting next to each 
other in the roadway in Parliament Square when they were arrested; they 
hugged, a little awkwardly. Arrested together and prosecuted together, they 
were nonetheless perfect strangers. 
The wider data from the survey points to a striking feature of climate change 
mobilisations: around one-fifth of participants (in both XR actions, as well 
as in the 2009/10 climate marches) claim to have participated alone. This is 
a relatively high figure; Wahlström and Wennerhag (2014) found, across 69 
European demonstrations, that on average as few as 7.2% of protesters 
attended alone and were also not asked by anyone to attend. Relatively low 
numbers in the XR protests participated with friends (43.1%), acquaintances 
(25.5%), their partner (27.8%), and fellow members of an organisation 
(32.9%). More striking still, personal contacts do not appear to be 
particularly strong as channels for mobilisation: only 19% of respondents 
claim that someone specifically asked them to take part in the protest, 
although 52% of them specifically asked someone else to participate.  
We also noticed that many defendants attended the court hearings on their 
own, without visible support from a local group. This may be in part because 
the charges were in almost all cases relatively minor, whilst XR’s mass arrest 
strategy may have had the effect of making a magistrates’ court hearing 
appear relatively routine. Yet numerous defendants gave heartfelt and 
sometimes highly emotional statements about what had driven them to 
break the law, with many in tears as they did so. There was an overwhelming 
sense that these are significant and symbolic moments for the defendants 
themselves. 
Whilst there were always others from XR present in support on these 
occasions, and also XR ‘wellbeing’ teams who waited outside police stations 
to look after arrestees when they were released, it was clear that in many 
cases the defendants had not previously met these support groups. The 
London protests, therefore, included a significant minority of participants 
who acted at least partly on their own, inspired by the general message of 
XR, and also many who went through the courts without direct support from 
other activists they already knew. This is unusual in the history of high-risk 
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forms of activism such as civil disobedience, where strong ties with fellow 
activists have been seen as crucial to developing commitment (McAdam 
1990). 
Clearly, by October 2019, attempts to raise awareness of XR actions via 
conventional media channels had paid off. Notably more of our protest 
survey respondents had found out about the XR demonstrations through TV, 
radio, and newspapers in October compared to April. But the most popularly 
checked sources for finding out about the demonstration were social media 
in April (55.3%) and fellow members in October (55.0%); in contrast, social 
media was less frequently mentioned in October (42.6%) as were, markedly 
so, fellow members in April (31.1%) (Table 4, below).  
Table 4 | Ways of hearing about the demonstration 
Notes: data are presented in columns. The columns add up to >100% because multiple answer options 
are possible. 
We also asked respondents to tell us which of these ways of hearing about 
the demonstration listed in Table 4, above, were the most important for 
them. Here, as Table 5 (below) demonstrates, only five of the ten channels 
of information were categorised as the most important channels of 
information by at least 10% of respondents. These are social media (31.9% 
in April, 20.2% in October), friends (21.4% in April, 13.2% in October), 
partner/family (16% in April, 7% in October), an organisation (11.7% in 
April, 19.3% in October) and fellow members (6.4% in April, 28.1% in 
October).  
These varying figures suggest a marked recruitment shift from April, when 
personal networks and related social media were much more important than 
organisational ties (69.3% vs 18.1% combined), to October, when 
organisational ties were much more important, if still not dominant (37.4%, 
vs 40.4% for personal ties and social media). We suggest two possible 
reasons for this shift. First, the changes in the relative importance of 
Channel of information Apr 2019 
(%) 
Oct 2019 
(%) 
Combined 
(%) 
Radio or TV 5.8 10.9 8.6 
Newspapers (online or print) 11.7 15.5 13.8 
Alternative online media 24.3 29.5 27.2 
Adverts / flyers / posters 21.4 24.0 22.8 
Partner / family 22.3 11.6 16.4 
Friends / acquaintances 44.7 39.5 41.8 
School / work 1.9 4.7 3.4 
Fellow members 31.1 55.0 44.4 
Organisation 17.5 50.4 35.8 
Online social media 55.3 42.6 48.3 
Total (n) 103 129 232 
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channels away from social media and towards other members might be 
representative of the changing demographic, as fewer young people 
participated in October. Second, by October XR had solidified its grassroots 
organisation, leading to stronger ties and better networking among its 
participants. Tables 4 and 5 therefore suggest that the development of local 
organisational capacity across 2019 helped XR participants hear about and 
participate in XR actions with fellow activists (a phenomenon known as 
meso-mobilisation; see Gerhards and Rucht 1992), particularly in October. 
Table 5 | The most important way of hearing about the demonstration 
Notes: data are presented in columns. The columns do not add up to 100% because only the five channels 
which are the most important for at least 10% of respondents in either survey are listed. 
Given the importance of organisations and fellow members as channels for 
hearing about the XR actions, it is important to examine the other 
organisations to which XR activists belonged to at the two points in time. In 
general, organisational membership is higher across multiple sectors in 
October compared to April (Table 6, below).  
The increase in organisational membership is particularly acute for 
environmental organisations (up from 69.1% in April to 81.4% in October), 
‘Global South’ organisations (from 33.7% up to 41.7%), peace organisations 
(20.7% compared to 27%), women’s organisations (up to 13.9% from 9.8%) 
and LGBT organisations (13.9% compared to 7.6%). These differences are 
likely to reflect the older age profile of the respondents to the mail-back 
survey. Older generations are more likely to participate in politics 
collectively through organisations (Whiteley, Pattie and Seyd 2004); and 
although trade union membership seems to be an exception to this, as it is 
lower in October (19.8%) than in April (27.2%), this is also most likely partly 
a consequence of the higher numbers of retirees in October. 
 
 
Channel of information April 2019 
(%) 
October 2019 
(%) 
Combined 
(%) 
Partner / family 16.0 7.0 11.1 
Friends / acquaintances 21.4 13.2 16.8 
Fellow members 6.4 28.1 18.3 
Organisation 11.7 19.3 15.9 
Online social media 31.9 20.2 25.5 
Total (n) 103 129 232 
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Table 6 | Organisational membership 
Notes: data are presented in columns. The columns total to more than 100% because multiple answer 
options are possible. The sample size is shown for rows rather than columns because of different 
proportions of missing data for each cell in the columns. 
For the October Rebellion only, the protest survey also asked XR 
participants if they had ever previously been a member of a range of 
environmental and related organisations. The relatively high responses for 
Transition Towns (25.0%), the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (27.6%), 
Amnesty International (45.9%), Friends of the Earth (47.3%), and 
Greenpeace (54.4%) suggest a tradition of participation in related campaigns 
amongst XR activists. While the highest figures are for Greenpeace, 
Amnesty, and FoE, possibly most important are the numbers for CND and 
Transition Towns because there may be a route from these organisations to 
XR’s repertoire of action. CND had its highpoint of membership in the 1980s 
(Maguire 1993) but has the strongest association with XR’s tactics of mass 
civil disobedience of any British campaign organisation. Meanwhile, the 
Transition Town movement, although not now as prominent as it was in the 
first decade of the 2000s, was strongest in south-west England, consistent 
with our data on XR’s strongest concentration of activism; and it has a 
strategy of creating positive practical alternatives locally rather than 
focusing on systemic political critique (Kenis 2016). Although both CND and 
Transition Towns have different aims to XR, it is not surprising to find that 
XR has recruited from, and is potentially strongly influenced by, those with 
past experience in both. 
Political engagement, trust and allegiances 
XR claims to be ‘beyond politics’, and is highly critical of what it calls the 
main political parties’ ‘business as usual’ approach to climate change. 
Indeed, controversially, XR chose not to endorse any parties or candidates 
Organisational types April 2019 
(%) 
October 2019 
(%) 
Combined  
(%) 
Environmental (n=212) 69.1 81.4 75.9 
Charity (n=208) 55.9 52.9 54.8 
Political party (n=209) 37.2 38.3 37.8 
Global South (n=207) 33.7 41.7 38.2 
Human rights (n=206 30.4 37.7 34.5 
Community (n=207) 29.3 29.6 29.5 
Trade union (n=208) 27.2 19.8 23.1 
Peace (n=207) 20.7 27 24.2 
Sport / cultural (n=207) 19.6 19.1 19.3 
Youth (n=206) 10.9 13.2 12.1 
Church or religious (n=208) 10.8 11.3 11.1 
Womens’(n=207) 9.8 13.9 12.1 
LGBT (n=207) 7.6 13.9 11.1 
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in the 2019 December general election. XR activists staged ‘bee’ actions (in 
which activists dressed as bees glued themselves to the parties’ campaign 
buses, because they are ‘bee-yond politics’) against the Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, and Conservative campaigns,13 despite the significant manifesto 
differences between the parties. Nonetheless, our protest survey evidence 
indicates that participants in XR’s April and October actions appear to have 
extraordinarily high rates of political engagement, including with political 
parties (over a third are members of a political party, Table 7), and they are 
generally interested in politics: in response to our survey questions, 80.9% 
in April and 88.8% in October say they were ‘quite’ or ‘very’ interested in 
politics.  
The vast majority of our respondents claimed to have voted in the May 2017 
general election (82.8% in April, 88.1% in October). These figures appear 
high, but they are underplayed given that that 14.0% of April respondents 
and 9.3% of October respondents claimed to be ineligible to vote in 2017. 
These figures point to a level of electoral participation which is much higher 
than the UK average (voter turnout at the 2017 general election was 68.7%). 
Further, XR participants’ high levels of electoral engagement do not appear 
to mask a wider disaffection with UK parliamentary politics: only a small 
minority ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that ‘I don’t see the use of voting, 
parties do whatever they want anyway’ (12.9% in April and 16.4% in 
October), even if there are high levels of distrust in political institutions, 
more generally. 
 
Figure 2 | Trust in institutions 
 
13 See Extinction Rebellion Newsletter, UK Newsletter #6: Vote for the Planet!, 9 December 2019: 
https://rebellion.earth/2019/12/09/uk-newsletter-6-vote-for-the-planet/  
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As Figure 2 shows, XR participants, in general, have low levels of trust in 
government, established mass media, parliament, and political parties. They 
are somewhat trusting of the police, but markedly more trusting of 
international institutions such as the EU and UN. They trust environmental 
organisations the most, although up to 10% are sceptical even of 
environmental organisations (Figure 2). In tune with the lack of trust for 
parliament and parties, 74.2% agree or strongly agree that ‘most politicians 
make a lot of promises but do not actually do anything’. 
As noted above, a central principle of XR is that it is beyond politics. But it 
is not always clear if this just means ‘beyond party politics’, as it is 
sometimes phrased in XR communications, or whether it is meant to define 
a position outside the political institutions, or whether it means being 
‘above’ ideology. Whilst XR is clearly making political demands on 
government, its founders have also explicitly aimed to appeal to a 
constituency of citizens beyond the common left-environmentalist 
constituency, as we noted (see Hallam 2019). However, if this is the aim, it 
is not reflected in the political allegiances of the activists who took part in 
the London protests.  
Indeed, the majority of XR respondents claim to most closely identify with 
the Green Party (59.1%), followed by Labour (15.5%), and the Liberal 
Democrats (3.9%). Across both surveys, only one participant claims to most 
closely identify with the Conservative Party, and only two respondents 
(1.1%) say they had voted Conservative in the 2017 general election. Whilst 
many of those who closely identify with the Green Party had supported it in 
the 2017 general election (33.7% of our respondents voted Green in 2017), 
Labour was the most voted for party (by 47.2% of respondents). 
Table 7 | Engagement in political acts in the past 12 months 
Notes: data are presented in columns. The columns total to more than 100% because multiple answer 
options are possible. The sample size is shown for rows rather than columns because of different 
proportions of missing data for each cell in the columns. Empty cells in the CCC column exist because 
those survey items were not included in the original CCC survey. 
Political acts Combined XR 
(%) 
UK Climate Marches  
% 
(n=602) 
Contacted a politician  69.3 80.0 
Signed a petition  96.7 91.5 
Donated money  71.2 66.1 
Boycotted  93.9 80.9 
Worn / displayed a badge  79.2 69.4 
Raised awareness on social media  75.9 - 
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XR’s activists are therefore primarily supporters of the Green Party, but 
more of them vote for the Labour Party, very likely because of the first past 
the post voting system. There is almost no support for the Conservatives or 
any other parties of the right, and very little support for the Liberal 
Democrats. XR is therefore clearly a movement of the left, and it will likely 
find it difficult to engage with the Conservative majority government. 
As we saw at the beginning of this report, most XR participants were not 
highly experienced protesters, but what about their broader political 
engagement? Typically, those who take to the streets to air their political 
grievances engage in both electoral and protest politics (Saunders 2014). As 
shown in Table 7, XR participants engage frequently in a range of political 
acts as do UK climate marchers (2009/10).  
Table 8 | Pro-Environmental Behaviours by XR activists in the past 12 months 
 
As might be expected, XR participants have high levels of engagement in 
pro-environmental behaviour (Table 8). We do not have comparable data at 
the national level, from other protest surveys, on pro-environmental 
behaviour; but much of the commentary hostile to XR focused on the 
supposed hypocrisy of XR activists and supporters. For example, whilst the 
Prime Minister referred, with typical provocation, to XR as ‘uncooperative 
crusties’ in ‘heaving hemp-smelling bivouacs’,14 right-wing media and 
politicians generally focused on what they saw as the hypocrisy of XR 
activists and celebrity supporters,15 and used ‘middle-class’ to suggest 
 
14 Boris Johnson calls Extinction Rebellion protesters ‘uncooperative crusties’, Metro, 8 October 2019: 
https://metro.co.uk/2019/10/08/boris-johnson-calls-extinction-rebellion-protesters-uncooperative-
crusties-10879623/  
15 See for example Iain Dale’s LBC interview with Rupert Read, Radio host laughs as climate activist 
admits he just took a taxi—'HYPOCRITE', The Express, 18 April 2019: 
https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1115872/extinction-rebellion-london-protest-climate-protest-lbc-
taxi-video; Donald MacLeod: What did London do to deserve Extinction Rebellion, another bunch of 
deluded toffs and timewasters?, The Sunday Post, 22 April 2019: 
https://www.sundaypost.com/fp/donald-macleod-what-did-london-do-to-deserve-extinction-
rebellion-another-bunch-of-deluded-toffs-and-timewasters/; EXCLUSIVE—Revealed: 'Rank hypocrisy' 
of globetrotting Extinction Rebellion jet setter's lifestyle after she shed 'crocodile tears' over climate 
protest that stopped son seeing his dying dad, Mail Online, 25 July 2019: 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7280851/Rank-hypocrisy-globetrotting-Extinction-
Rebellion-jet-setters-lifestyle-luxury-holidays.html; Conservative MP for Monmouth David Davies’s 
Pro-environmental behaviours Apr 2019 
(%) 
Oct 2019 
(%) 
Combined XR 
(%) 
Buycotted (n=203) 92.6 98.3 95.6 
Changed diet (n=187) 86.2 89.8 88.2 
Consumed less (n=105) 94.7 89.8 92.0 
Reused products (n=211) 100.0 99.2 99.5 
Reduced household energy (n=187) 87.2 89.0 88.2 
Purchased second-hand goods (n=191) 89.4 90.7 90.1 
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dismissively that its politics could be explained by its social base.16 Given 
these attacks, the non-uniformity in affirmative answers to questions about 
participation in pro-environmental behaviour may indicate a certain 
resilience among XR protesters to the relentless focus of critics on their 
personal conduct, as if any individual ‘lapse’ disproved their wider 
arguments. 
These kinds of attacks were probably expected by XR. What is interesting in 
this respect is that activists appearing in court consistently gave accounts of 
how they had moved towards civil disobedience once they realised that 
changing their own patterns of consumption was ineffective. They stated 
that only political action by governments would bring about the major 
changes needed to avert climate catastrophe. As one 40 year old woman put 
it in court, when pleading guilty: 
I recycle obsessively, refill my water bottle, no longer eat meat, I’ve signed 
multiple petitions and written to my MP, stopped my 15 year career working in 
retail marketing, and I have not had children. All of these actions have had no 
effect.  
The political engagement of XR activists thus combines above average levels 
of voting and membership of political parties, with high engagement in pro-
environmental behaviours, participation in disruptive protest and high 
levels of scepticism about the ability of political parties and government to 
deliver solutions. Whilst XR activists are overwhelmingly committed to 
taking responsibility for their own personal consumption, as the quote 
above illustrates, and as we further illustrate below, they are sanguine about 
the impact lifestyle change will have on preventing climate breakdown.  
  
 
letter to the ‘climate protest backing pop group’ The 1975, asking them if they were setting off on their 
world tour ‘by train or yacht’, 27 August 2019: 
https://twitter.com/DavidTCDavies/status/1167343239822790656?s=20  
16 Dominic Lawson, Deluded middle-class climate warriors can’t see the real danger of their bright idea, 
Mail Online, 15 April 2019: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-6922371/DOMINIC-LAWSON-
Deluded-middle-class-climate-warriors-real-danger-bright-idea.html  
CC-BY-N
C-ND 2.0 :: Sim
on Evans / Flickr 
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Climate Breakdown: Diagnosis and Prognosis 
In its statement of values, XR seeks to balance challenging what it defines 
as a ‘toxic system’, including the profit-driven neoliberal economy, with an 
avoidance of personal attacks (Principle 8, ‘we avoid blaming and 
shaming’).17 In other words, a critical view of institutions and practices need 
not mean a focus on individuals as personally responsible. This is quite a 
complex position to ask activists to adhere to; what can we discern from our 
protest surveys regarding who or what XR activists think is to blame for the 
environmental crisis? In their answers to an open question on this, 
respondents were consistent with XR’s principles: they overwhelmingly 
wrote about fossil fuel companies, greed, and capitalism. A 60-year old 
woman, who took part in the October ‘Rebellion’, for instance, wrote that 
she blamed ‘fossil fuel industries, greedy capitalists and disregard for people 
in developing countries’. 
We also asked XR protesters about who, or what, is best placed to solve our 
environmental problems, using answer options common to surveys of 
climate protests. None of the options offered were strongly supported by XR 
respondents. Although they were more positive about science than 
government, companies and the market, and individual lifestyle changes, 
only 41.1% of XR protest survey respondents agree that we can rely on 
science to any degree (see Figure 3, below). Companies and the market are 
trusted the least (88.5% disagreed or strongly disagreed that companies and 
the markets can solve our environmental problems, whilst 86.6% disagreed 
or strongly disagreed that we can rely on government to solve 
environmental problems). This seems to be a potential point of contention 
for XR: its strategy emphasises lobbying the government for action, but its 
activists do not think the government can deliver. The answer to this tension 
may lie in XR’s third demand, that decisions on the transition to net zero 
carbon be taken by citizens’ assemblies based on popular sortition (the 
random selection of participants, chosen to be representative of the 
population in general). 
With regards to specific measures, there was a mix of answers to qualitative 
questions: some want the government to act to cut emissions, others wrote 
more specifically about the need to decarbonise the economy and invest in 
renewables. Some talked about a transition to a more respectful society, 
reflecting XR’s support for ‘regenerative culture’, whereas others called for 
a deeper and more urgent structural transformation—as a 23-year-old 
woman participant put it, ‘Radical, immediate and COMPLETE system 
change’ (emphasis in her original answer). 
 
17 See Extinction Rebellion, Our Principles and Values, last accessed 29 May 2020: 
https://rebellion.earth/the-truth/about-us/  
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Figure 3 | Percentage of XR respondents (dis)agreeing with the statement “To what extent 
do you agree that [each of the following] can be relied on to solve our environmental 
problems?” 
 
Motivations and emotions 
In their answers to open questions in the survey about why they decided to 
participate in the XR actions, activists gave a variety of reasons, including 
the urgency of the situation, the need to make the government stand up and 
act, belief in personal and group efficacy, and moral obligation. In relation 
to urgency, one 32 year-old woman told us that she participated: 
because all the less disruptive forms of campaigning have failed and we have 
basically run out of time to prevent climate breakdown and the human and 
animal suffering that will be caused by this.  
A retired participant with no dependents told us that they: 
have no reason to worry about the effects of a possible criminal record. Also, 
because I have been around since before climate change was first mooted as a 
problem and have been largely unaware of the emergency our lifestyle was 
bringing on.  
Some wrote about existential threats, the likelihood of human extinction, 
and out of control degradation of the planet. In a statement stressing the 
need for government to act, a 23 year-old woman wrote:  
Because I believe that the environment and our planet's future should be the UK 
government, and the international community's, top priority. 
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0
Modern science
Governments
Companies and the market
Individual lifestyles
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
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In relation to efficacy, many participants expressed their wish to, or belief 
that they could, be effective: 
I agree with the 3 key aims of XR and want to make a difference. (59 year-old 
man)  
collective action is most likely to be effective. (66 year-old man) 
I want to help save the planet and have given my support to a movement I believe 
could bring about that change. (26 year-old woman) 
Answers to closed survey questions also show XR participants’ strong belief 
in their ability—as individuals or organised groups—to influence positive 
change. Over 70% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that ‘my 
participation can have an impact on public policy in this country’; more than 
80% agreed that ‘organised groups can have a lot of impact’; and the same 
proportion believed that ‘if citizens from different countries join forces, they 
can have a lot of impact on international policies’. 
These answers reflected a strong belief among participants that their action 
had a strong instrumental purpose: for example, 99.0% agreed or strongly 
agreed that they were motivated to participate in the actions in order to 
‘raise awareness’, and 99.5% to ‘pressure politicians’, Figure 4, below. But 
respondents also underlined that their participation stemmed from a wider 
sense of civic duty, with 95.8% agreeing or strongly agreeing that they felt 
‘morally obliged’ to participate in the action. For one participant, a 34 year-
old man, ‘As someone aware of the issues we’re facing I felt I was morally 
obliged’; others referred to their moral obligation to future generations, 
with one 58 year-old woman citing the familiar phrase: ‘If not me, then who? 
If not now, then when?’. 
In general, these answers demonstrate strong support for a range of 
standard motivations for political protest: the vast majority agree that they 
are participating as a means of raising awareness, followed by pressuring 
politicians, feeling morally obliged, expressing solidarity, and defending 
their interests. Self-interest is the least agreed with motivation; even here, 
however, more than half agreed that this was also a reason explaining their 
participation. Some XR participants therefore believe they are acting in their 
own interest—but this number remains much lower than ‘expressing 
solidarity’. Clearly, therefore, XR participants are acting for others as well 
as (or perhaps more accurately, rather than) just themselves. 
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Figure 4 | XR respondents’ motivation as expressed in response to the question:  
“I participated in this demonstration in order to / because I felt …” (%) 
 
The nature of this interest is more clearly identifiable in our respondents’ 
answers to our next question. More than other environmental groups, XR 
has encouraged its activists to express their emotions, particularly their 
grief about the damage caused by climate change; and Figure 5 (below) 
shows how the issue resonates emotionally with participants. Frustration, 
worry, and anger are the most prevalent emotions, followed by anxiety and 
fear. In contrast, powerlessness and hopelessness are the least felt 
emotions, suggesting that participation expresses a sense of public agency, 
although even here a majority of participants did feel ‘quite’ or ‘very much’ 
affected. 
Figure 5 | “Climate change makes me feel …” 
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Conclusions 
Our report shows that Extinction Rebellion has successfully mobilised 
activists who had relatively little previous experience of protest. This can, 
to some extent, be explained by a youth effect. However, if XR protesters 
have a similar age profile to climate change marchers (2009/10), they also 
have a much broader age profile than has typically been the case for 
environmental direct action, which in the UK at least has previously been 
the preserve of small networks of mainly young activists. XR has to this 
extent transformed the politics of direct action in the UK, and not only 
because many more XR activists were arrested in 2019 than in these previous 
waves of environmental direct action. Nonetheless, XR protesters’ socio-
demographic profile looks strikingly familiar to observers of environmental 
and related movements. XR can justifiably be placed within a longer UK 
tradition which Frank Parkin, in his study of CND in the late 1960s, called 
‘Middle Class Radicalism’ (1968; see also Cotgrove and Duff, 1980, on earlier 
environmental activism). As with CND, activists in XR are much more likely 
than the general population to have a university education, to identify on 
the left, to be members of other political organisations, and to express their 
political motivations in moral terms, as a responsibility to do what they can 
to avert a catastrophe.  
Part of the appeal of XR as a vehicle for action on climate change may be 
because it reflects a wider mood in progressive politics. Political scientists 
have previously identified critical citizens to be those who ‘adhere strongly 
to democratic values but who find the existing structures of representative 
government, invented in the 18th and 19th centuries, to be wanting’ (Norris 
1999: 2). As our evidence shows, XR activists are highly politically engaged 
while also disenchanted with conventional ways of doing politics, and have 
little faith in governments to make the changes required to avert a climate 
catastrophe.  
More recently, Paolo Gerbaudo (2017) has coined the term citizenism to 
understand the left-progressive movements that developed across southern 
Europe in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-9. These movements 
revealed a desire for collective political participation, occupying public 
spaces, and seeking new forms of participatory democracy, demanding the 
return of sovereignty to the people from financial and political elites. For 
XR, whose roots are also in this wider wave of anti-austerity social 
movements, this form of citizenism is visible in the campaign’s demand for 
citizens’ assemblies, for governments to act based on the evidence of 
climate breakdown, and to ‘(re)locate relations of power in the physical 
space of the everyday’ (Hayes 2017: 32). For the ‘ordinary’ respondents to 
our surveys, citizenism is visible in the sense of moral obligation to act that 
drives their public participation and social agency. 
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The challenge for the new climate activists of XR, as for all movements based 
on citizenism, is how to sustain action beyond asserting their demands, and 
how to build effective alliances that can reach beyond their core social base. 
Until the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change mobilisations looked set to 
be central to the political and media agenda prior to the planned COP26 in 
Glasgow in November 2020 (now delayed until at least November 2021). 
Dependent on what kind of politics develops post COVID-19, if XR makes 
the right strategic decisions, it has the opportunity to continue to shape 
climate politics domestically and, potentially, internationally. 
 
 
 
Markus Spiske 
CC.0 :: Markus Spiske / Unsplash 
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Afterword: From ‘A Country Mouse’ 
I became a first time activist with XR at the April 2019 rebellion in London. 
It wasn’t part of the plan. 
I retired early from teaching in a primary school and latterly headship in 
2017 with the intention of enjoying my new-found life of leisure at home in 
Pembrokeshire, with frequent trips to folk festivals and occasional overseas 
adventures. As a committed teacher I had always been busy, working long 
hours and preoccupied with work; I hadn’t made the time to even find out 
properly about issues beyond education, let alone take any action. I love 
wildlife and was aware that humans were damaging the natural world 
through pollution, habitat destruction and greenhouse gas emissions. I 
wished more was being done to reverse this, but that’s as far as it went. 
It took until October 2018 for me to be shaken. First the starkness of the 
IPCC report together with the lack of response from governments alarmed 
me. Then Greta Thunberg. A fifteen year old was making a stand on her own 
and I was just a bystander. I felt ashamed of myself. In particular, I was 
incensed by the insulting, often dismissive comments made about her. But 
knowing she was right yet not acting on it would almost be worse. So I would 
stop flying and buying new clothes and reduce my car travel and meat 
consumption, but I was under no illusions that this would make much 
difference. 
I went along to the next local XR ‘talk’ (Heading for Extinction and What to 
Do About It), which set out an outline of the science on climate change and 
biodiversity loss and the rationale behind XR’s approach. The science was 
clear and terrifying; the rationale made sense. We are on the road to hell. 
The damage is caused by human systems, which it is physically possible to 
change. We need to force government action. Civil disobedience has worked 
in the past and it might work now. While something, anything, can be done, 
we should do it. XR was offering a model for action, which was what I 
needed. 
XR is not perfect, but it’s my best option. By banding together, we share 
knowledge, experience and strengths and we support each other. Being with 
other rebels keeps my head out of the sand and confirms that it is not me 
but the current system that is insane. 
As a country mouse, going to London for the April rebellion with a one way 
coach ticket, a sleeping bag and a tent was a journey into the unknown. I had 
been on three demonstrations ever, all non-disruptive with no interaction 
with the police. I had no idea where I’d be going or what I’d be doing. The 
non-violent direct action training (NVDA) I had completed helped, as did 
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knowing a handful of people from attending a few local meetings. I can't 
overstate just how welcoming and supportive the XR culture and individual 
rebels are.  
I spent most of the first week on Oxford Circus and my first arrest there was 
shown on BBC news. My partner forwarded an email I had pre-written to my 
successor as head of two Cornish primary schools, including a message to 
the children explaining why I was doing something that might get me into 
trouble with the police. The new head showed the children video of my arrest 
and read them my message. In the second week of the April rebellion I was 
arrested at the London Stock Exchange. 
Back home, I helped set up a new local group, learned to give trainings and 
learned a lot more about the science of climate change and biodiversity loss. 
I took part in actions including the summer uprising in Cardiff. I went back 
to London in August 2019 to carry out an action at the Brazilian Embassy 
(crown court case this summer) and again for the October rebellion. My 
partner and our daughter came in October too. Our daughter was arrested in 
the first week. I took part in direct actions throughout, and was finally 
arrested at the end of the second week on Oxford Circus again. After October 
I felt despair at the lack of government or mainstream media response to 
this mass disruption. 
I have a very faint glimmer of hope in the midst of the pain of the 
coronavirus pandemic, that among the upheaval, radical change looks more 
possible. Perhaps realising our vulnerability will bring more empathy for 
those currently suffering and for the future generations that will suffer from 
the effects of the climate and ecological emergency.  The politicians and 
public need nudging to make a conscious choice rather than rushing back to 
business as usual. 
I am very fortunate in many ways. I am white, middle class, I no longer work 
and I have no caring responsibilities; it is relatively safe for me to engage in 
NVDA, which is all the more reason why I should step up again when the 
lockdown is over. Failing to act would make me complicit.  
Sian Vaughan 
Extinction Rebellion first-time activist 
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Appendix: Methodology 
The survey was distributed to XR protesters in London in April and October 
2019. It is a modified version of a survey and method used on scores of 
demonstrations across Europe (Klandermans et al 2009) since the early 
2000s (see Caught in the Act of Protest project protocols available at: 
http://www.protestsurvey.eu/). We handed out flyers with a link to an online 
survey and carried out face-to-face interviews with every fifth demonstrator 
we approached.  
We carried out our first survey on Monday 15 April—the first day of the 
London ‘rebellion’. A team of six researchers covered two sites—Parliament 
Square from late morning until late afternoon, and then Waterloo Bridge in 
the early evening. We gave out 629 flyers, conducted 124 face-to-face 
interviews, and had 103 online responses (a 16.4% response rate). 
In October 2019, nine researchers covered eight of the blockades. One 
blockade (Lambeth Bridge) was surveyed on the afternoon of Monday 7 
October; six were surveyed on Tuesday 8 October (The Home Office, the 
Department of Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, The Mall, Trafalgar 
Square, Milbank and the War Memorial); and one on Saturday 12 October 
(Vauxhall). We aimed to survey all XR participants at each of these sites, 
with varying degrees of success depending on the nature of policing 
(surveying was more difficult when people were being arrested in high 
numbers), the weather (ranging from drizzle to rain), and the capacity of 
small groups of researchers.  
At the October Rebellion, we handed out 985 leaflets and conducted 179 
face-to-face interviews. 12 people (6.3% of those asked) refused to 
participate in a face-to-face interview; 27 people refused to take a leaflet 
when presented with a leaflet only; and 12 refused to take a leaflet after the 
face-to-face interview was complete. We received 130 responses to the 
online survey, yielding a response rate of 13.2%. 
Given the low numbers of people who refuse to participate in the face-to-
face interviews, they are used as a tool to measure non-response bias. The 
face-to-face and online surveys have matched respondent numbers allowing 
us to compare those who complete the face-to-face interview only 
(considered a sub-sample of everyone on the demonstration) to those who 
complete both the face-to-face interview and the online interview 
(considered a sub-sample of those who complete the interview). Around 10 
identical questions are asked in the two surveys. Tests for 
representativeness of the data usually find that those who reply are more 
likely to be highly educated, politically interested and female than their 
counterparts (Walgrave et al 2016). Our data shows that the only significant 
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measurable difference between the two samples is with regards to age. We 
find that younger people are significantly less likely to complete the online 
survey. In the combined sample (April and October) 21.5% respondents who 
completed just the face-to-face interview were under the age of 25, whereas 
for both surveys 7.9% were in that age category. The difference is not 
significant for the April data alone; but it is significant in the October (as 
well as combined) datasets. It is for this reason that we present age category 
frequencies from the face- to-face data rather than from the online survey. 
All other protest survey data we present is from the online survey. 
None of the other variables in the face-to-face survey have significant 
differences across the two samples, despite the relatively low response rate 
(14.6%): gender, when respondents decided to make a firm decision to 
participate in the demonstration; past protest participation; political 
interest; highest educational qualification and satisfaction with democracy 
are relatively constant among those who answered both the face-to-face and 
mail-back and those who answered the mail-back only.  
This means that the data is considerably more representative (and the 
sample is therefore a lot more reliable) than most protest survey datasets. 
We attribute the low response rate for October in part to the poor weather—
it was raining almost all of the time during our surveying efforts. A second 
factor in both was the long duration of the Rebellion. The April rebellion 
lasted for ten days and the October rebellion for two weeks, and we are 
therefore doubtful that many of the leaflets with the QR code / link to the 
online survey made it safely back to a computer for data entry. 
In much of this report, we compare and contrast those who attended the 
April and October mobilisations. It is important to note that 16 of our survey 
respondents claim to have provided answers to both surveys—these 
individuals are included in both sub-samples, but their answers to the 
October survey are removed from the aggregated analysis—where we 
analyse April and October respondents as one sample. 
As noted, we also gathered data from plea hearings at the City of London 
Magistrates Court. Four researchers observed hearings on seven separate 
Fridays in August, September, and October 2019, with 144 individual 
defendants in total.  
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